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1. Introduction  
 
The Cooperative Research Centres (CRC) program is the Australian Government’s 
largest single investment in cross-sector R&D absorbing A$200 million annually in 
federal funding. The Centres are archetypal ‘triple helix’ structures: highly complex 
inter-organizational arrangements involving universities, federal and State 
(provincial) government research agencies, individual firms, and various industry-led 
public sector intermediaries.  
CRCs were first funded in 1990, following the example of centres like the US 
NSF Engineering Research Centers and the UK Science and Engineering Research 
Council’s Interdisciplinary Research Centres in the mid 1980s. Over the life of 
program, 168 centres have been established: 102 of these were new, and 66 were 
formed from existing CRCs (O’Kane, 2008). There are currently (2007-08) 58 CRCs 
in operation, covering a wide range of industrially-oriented research (such as 
polymers or advanced automotive technology) and ‘public good’ research (such as 
Aboriginal health or greenhouse gas accounting), each funded for an initial seven-year 
term (renewable, subject to competition, where a significantly new research is 
proposed).  
 The CRCs’ US antecedents, Industry-University Cooperative Research 
Centers (IUCRC) have been in place since the late 1970s (Cohen et al. 1994). These 
collaborative structures have been complemented by the Engineering Research 
Centres (ERCs) and the Science and Technology Centres (STCs). All are directed in 
one way or another towards enhancing technology transfer (Steenhuis and Gray, 
2006). Like the Australian model these centres, apart from their potential 
contributions to technology transfer, carry implications for organizational 
management. Steenhuis and Gray have drawn attention to the various organizational 
strategies adopted by these US centres. 
 The importance, organizational complexity, financial scale and potentially far reaching 
implications of these research organizations necessitate an emphasis on the management 
systems and structures of STCs (Steenhuis and Gray, 2006, p. 58). 
 
Steenhuis and Gray’s findings (2006, pp.74-76) suggest a wide variation in 
management strategies between centres. This could be because optimal organizational 
management models are still evolving, or the nature of centres is so varied that 
strategic management models will always be somewhat heterogeneous. They suggest, 
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however, that variation in strategies emerges because cooperative research centres are 
not in competition with other such centres but are acting as intermediaries between 
academic research interests and the technology interests of the commercial partners. 
Although they may in practical terms be operating as intermediaries, the 
partner organizations – universities, public research institutes and firms – that make 
up these triple helix entities are in highly competitive environments. Universities 
compete with each other for students, staff, research income and academic kudos. 
Research institutes also compete for scientific staff, for external research funding, for 
treasury budget allocations and government contracts. Industry partners are in a 
commercially competitive environment, but also compete for scientific staff and the 
intellectual property rewards this can bring. Moreover, as we have documented 
elsewhere, collaborative research centres are also in competition with the 
departmental organizational structures that exist within their partner universities 
(Garrett-Jones et al 2005a). This has implications for the career options for research 
personnel. There are potential rewards such as access to new equipment and to be 
working with leading-edge scientists. There are also potential risks for scientists that 
their work and consequently careers may be driven in unintended directions by their 
CRC involvement. As CRC researchers seek to resolve tension between potential 
rewards and risks there are also implications for the partner organizations. This is 
because linking their career options more directly to a CRC is often achieved by 
reducing commitment to the partner organization that employs them.  
 
1.2 Managing CRCs 
 
A wide range of apparently successful management structures have evolved across the 
Australian CRCs. They sometimes engage a chief executive and administrative and 
R&D staff in a central office, but most CRC researchers are employed by their 
university, business or government laboratory where they continue to work, rather 
than by the CRC itself. To this extent the CRCs are virtual centres – even if legally 
incorporated. CRCs, like other industry-linked research centres, can thus become 
highly complex inter-organizational networks. For example, the CRC for Polymers – 
now in its third round of 7-year funding – combines 11 participant companies in the 
plastics industry (two of which are spin-off companies from the CRC), two large 
federal government research agencies, 10 universities, a state government department 
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and another independent cross-sector R&D centre. What is perhaps different about 
Australia’s CRCs compared with cross-sector R&D centres in other countries is the 
strong involvement of the government research sector, particularly the CSIRO, 
Australia’s largest federal research organization. Government (federal and state) is 
therefore represented not just by facilitation and finance, but by day to day 
participation as a partner in the research program of most CRCs. 
The CRC collaborative model and the variety of management approaches for 
organising them have attracted considerable attention and debate. The common 
themes in the literature focus on the tensions between differing industry and public 
sector expectations and objectives. However, while these are clearly important factors, 
the drive to maximise opportunities for ‘reward’ and minimise ‘risk’ from the 
multifocal point of view of research personnel. has received less attention. In these 
evolving triple helix structures there are risks for organizational partners and there are 
risks for scientists’ careers and for their students. We aim to understand more about 
the experiences of CRC research personnel (researchers and research managers) and 
the extent to which their expectations and work at CRCs are contributing to the 
formation of sustainable organizational structures. Our objective is to shed light on 
two key questions: (1) what drives a researcher to become involved in (and to stay 
committed to) these complex and often unwieldy organizations; and (2) how do 
researchers perceive and manage the risks and rewards of participation in these 
centres. Answers to both questions carry implications for the effective management of 
CRCs and their organizational sustainability, as well as for their constituent partner 
organizations. 
 
2.  Critical Issues in the Literature 
 
There is a large body of literature on cross-sector R&D collaboration that seeks to 
explain how CRC-type organizations have evolved and how they can best be 
managed. Three enduring research themes within this literature are of direct relevance 
to our interests in this article. These are: (1) explaining how the competing goals and 
expectations of partners can be integrated within a single collaborative centre; (2) 
explaining how trust is (or is not) generated and the implications this has for how 
partners interact with and treat each other; and (3) explaining how the careers of 
scientists might change through the choices they have within CRCs. 
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2.1 Synthesising Competing and Complementary Goals  
 
According to Lee (2000) a sustainable collaboration is one where each partner allows 
the other to realize their objectives while also contributing to mutual goals. The 
problems that arise in the management of CRCs can thus be understood in terms of 
the difficulty of accommodating heterogeneity in the cultures and ‘functional 
domains’ of the partners and of avoiding potential competition between them (Garrett-
Jones et al., 2006). For example, the reward structures of the partner organization and 
the CRC may not be aligned, or scientists may find the commercial imperatives of 
industry too short-term. This leads to a perceived problem of coordination and 
governance in a multi-institutional environment where the partners and research 
personnel essentially remain free-agents. 
Yet inter-organizational networks like CRCs seek to encourage innovation by 
bringing together people with a diversity of expectations and goals, and with greater 
‘cognitive distance’ (CD) between them (Nooteboom, 2000). A large CD has the 
merit of bringing in new ideas, but also creates problems of incomprehensibility. The 
partners will have different views – not just about the science of the project, but, as 
Gibbons et al. (1994) point out, also about what constitutes ‘fair play’. Siegel et al. 
(2001, p. 5) succinctly identify the management issue in these sorts of cross-sector 
R&D arrangements: 
A critical organizational issue is how universities and firms manage these relationships, in 
light of the fact that the key players in [university-industry technology transfer] (i.e., scientists, 
university administrators, and firms entrepreneurs) have different motives and incentives and 
operate in different organizational cultures.  
It is necessary then to consider first what is regarded as legitimate competition, 
collaboration, ownership and reward (Gibbons et al., 1994), and second how 
objectives and strategies are defined and implemented (Steenhuis and Gray, 2006). 
This raises the question of what appropriate balance between trust and ‘formal 
government’ (Menard, 2004) is required to coordinate cross-sector R&D 
organizations, and what form of ‘governance’ and rules are accepted and enforced. 
Much of the debate around this issue concerns the differing expectations of CRC 
partner organizations and how this can best be managed. We are concerned here 
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equally with the expectations of the research personnel who constitute the CRC but 
who have concurrent employment commitments to partner organizations. 
 
2.2 Building Trust between Partners 
 
Although CRCs are formal structures, they remain to some extent ‘virtual centres’. 
Researchers, funding and projects come and go – bringing with them organizational 
allegiances, expectations and commitments - and taking them with them if they leave. 
Holland and Lockett (1998, p. 606) describe the coalescence of virtual organizations 
around outcomes, and the need to deal with the risk that the outcome may not be 
achieved: ‘there is a significant level of risk associated with the outcome… and 
organizational trust has been hypothesized to be an explanatory variable for the 
development of such cooperative behaviour’. For Daellenbach and Davenport (2004, 
p. 189) ‘this reflects the expectation that partners will act competently and recognize 
and protect the interests of other alliance members’.  
In a voluntary alliance like a CRC the participant organizations and individuals 
expect to be involved in decision-making and to be ‘justly’ treated if they are to 
remain a member. Daellenbach and Davenport (2004) assess the role of distributive 
justice (fair allocation of outcomes and rewards) and procedural justice (fair handling 
of processes, such as decision making, agreement on procedural norms, conflict 
resolution and governance) in the establishment of technology alliances involving 
firms and public sector research institutes. They note that how these elements of 
governance are dealt with is crucial to building trust within the collaboration.  
Academic science is built on trust in the quality and validity of research 
performed. This is ensured through public sharing of knowledge (Liebeskind and 
Oliver, 1998). However, in the context of cross-sector R&D, this raises the questions 
of how partner organizations from each of the three sectors and the research personnel 
are selected in the first place (Daellenbach and Davenport, 2004).  
Nooteboom (2000) deals with this issue by distinguishing between two elements 
of trust: competence (or the capability to deliver the agreed outcomes) and intention 
(the degree to which parties are committed to the avowed goals and avoid 
opportunism — that is, putting self-interest above the goals of the centre). But for us, 
trust is a very personal measure. Organizational trust emerges only to the extent that 
its members trust the members of another organization. This further directs our 
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analysis to the experiences and expectations of the research personnel. How do 
individual participants assess trust and reputation (and its breach), how is trust built 
and how do they respond when faced with opportunist behaviour? 
 
2.3 Career choices and balancing reward and risk 
 
Several studies have examined the value of participation in cross-sector R&D centres 
for business participants (Adams et al., 2001; Feller et al., 2002). Industry 
perspectives from our present study are reported elsewhere (Couchman and Fulop, 
2004). For business partners rewards are generally tangible and well articulated, such 
as acquiring new intellectual property, developing a new product or solving a problem 
in production. For individual public sector researchers rewards may be less tangible 
such as extensions to research networks and access to new ideas and new research 
problems. But they are just as important for weighing up employment career options. 
As Lee (2000) points out, university researchers would not engage with industry 
unless they felt that the collaboration brought them significant and important benefits. 
But for research personnel we would expect a greater degree of intangible benefit than 
for business partners.  
Lee’s survey of 427 faculty members in US universities who were engaged in 
R&D projects with industry showed a range of motives for collaborating with 
industry. Among the benefits he identifies for university researchers are: funding for 
research and scholarships, insight through practical application of research, 
experience relevant to teaching, job placement or business opportunities, and 
furthering the mission of the university. The material benefits of funding for research 
staff or equipment were most highly regarded, as were the intangible benefits relating 
to gaining insight into ones own research and testing applications of theory. 
Expectations were generally realized as benefits in Lee’s study: a majority of faculty 
members experienced ‘substantial and considerable benefits to their academic 
research dimension’ (p. 121). Other motivations such as seeking entrepreneurship, 
jobs for their students, or furthering the university’s mission were not nearly as 
important to them. This finding, however, is somewhat puzzling as it runs counter to 
the growing body of literature showing that scientists make career choices because of 
the more intangible benefits such as enhancing science networks, kudos and testing 
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new ideas (Turpin et al, 2008). It may reflect national differences in institutional 
research funding mechanisms.  
Recent work by Dietz and Bozeman (2005) compares the career paths and 
achievements of 1200 US academic scientists working in industry-linked research 
centres, contrasting those who have worked solely in academia with those who have 
followed ‘non-traditional’ paths involving work in industry or government. Dietz and 
Bozeman hypothesise that, for academic scientists, ‘intersectoral changes in jobs 
throughout the career will provide access to new social networks, resulting in higher 
productivity’ (p. 353). They also note that ‘job diversity [is] associated with increased 
collaboration’ (p. 353). They suggest that the research centres are having measurable 
impact on the research careers of engineers and scientists and, consequently, on the 
culture of the universities that employ them.  
Steenhuis and Gray (2005, 2006) make two observations on the US centres 
that are pertinent here. The first is that the more recently established centres have 
directors who are more industry focused and ‘better prepared to deal with strategy 
development’ (2006, p. 76). Secondly, in the USA, the development of strategic plans 
is driven by different management approaches. In the case of IURCs they are driven 
largely by external groups. In the case of ERCs they are driven by creative leaders, 
and in the case of STCs, by management teams. In contrast, in typical university 
research centres the strategic plan is driven by an individual or group of faculty 
members. Thus Steenhuis and Gray argue that it is the nature of the program with its 
specific technological and commercial objectives that attract specific drivers for 
strategy. 
All of the critical he issues discussed above deal in one way or another with 
ambivalence surrounding choices about working in CRCs. At an organizational level 
choices are made about shoring up institutional credentials, about investing financial 
and human resources and about pressing for certain strategic directions to gain return 
from these investments. At an individual level choices are made about setting research 
priorities, applying for grants, preparing publications and maximising options for 
future employment and careers. In making choices about their careers research 
personnel will the consider strength of their allegiances to various partner 
organizations within the CRCs. We are interested to know how individuals make 
these choices, about the implications for the partner organizations and for the 
sustainability of the CRC as an enduring organizational structure. At a broader level 
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we believe this analysis can inform the proposition presented by Dietz and Bozeman 
(2005) that academic careers are changing in some fundamental way.  
 
3. The Role of Government in CRCs  
 
Government research institutions are directly involved in most Australian CRCs as 
partner organizations and have invested over A$1 billion of their research funding 
through such collaboration (O’Kane, 2008). They bring to the CRC expectations from 
government about how their institutional research budgets (public funds) should be 
strategically managed. The program as a whole is managed and funded by the federal 
Government which has invested around A$3 billion over the life of the program. An 
equivalent amount has been leveraged from universities (O’Kane, 2008). Government 
expectations about the strategic direction of the program have been inconsistent. 
Program objectives from the outset were to promote ‘the links between research and 
its commercial and other applications’ (Slatyer, 1994). Objectives ‘drifted 
significantly’ from the original ones through the ensuing decade (Howard Partners, 
2003) with the government insisting on a more commercial focus for the CRCs. In the 
initial rounds of CRCs an industry partner was ‘strongly encouraged’ but was not 
mandatory (Cooperative Research Centres Committee, 1991). In 2004 the government 
announced that the CRC Program would have ‘a stronger commercial focus’ through 
strong industry partners and plans for commercialisation or utilisation. Similar 
observations have been made about collaborative centres in the US becoming more 
multidisciplinary and more application-oriented (Steenhuis and Gray, 2006).  
Recently, a national review of the Australian CRC program has recommended a 
move towards broader public good outcomes and translating investments into social 
and environmental benefit as well as economic benefit. The review also calls for a 
stronger focus on delivering end-user benefits rather than being directly involved in 
commercialization, and encourages greater flexibility in strategic directions (O’Kane, 
2008). This ebb and flow of government expectations between commercial or public 
good priorities carries implications for those within CRCs. As program objectives 
shift so too will the expectations, career options and allegiances among the personnel 
involved in the centres. 
CRCs in Australia differ from programs like the US Engineering Research 
Centres in covering a broader spectrum of research; in having more the character of 
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‘virtual institutes’ (researchers largely remain employed by their ‘home’ organization, 
not by CRC itself); and in many cases (despite an original intention of research 
concentration) by being widely distributed geographically across Australia. 
Effectively, they combine the objectives of all three US Centres programs described 
above. Thus the Australian centres are more heterogeneous in their objectives and 
contexts (and potentially – following Steenhuis and Gray – in their structure) than, 
say, the US IUCRCs or ERCs. We therefore expected to find a greater degree of 
variation in the way Australian CRC research personnel are motivated to join CRCs 
and subsequently balanced opportunities for reward with potential risk, than in the 




Our empirical evidence is drawn from a survey of 370 respondents from 
public sector organizations involved with CRCs carried out in 2005. The written, 
mixed-mode (postal and web-based) survey covered a non-random but representative 
sample of people involved in the management and conduct of CRC-based research 
(Diment and Garrett-Jones, 2007). Respondents (34% response rate) comprised 
researchers and research managers involved either directly as participants in one or 
more of 37 CRCs or indirectly with CRCs (e.g. responsible for managing some aspect 
of the organization’s involvement in the CRC). The majority of respondents (53 per 
cent) identified themselves as from the higher education (HE) sector, with 21 per cent 
from the government research (GR) sector. Analysis of in-depth interviews with 
around 30 research managers from university and other public sector partners of 
selected CRCs (Garrett-Jones et al., 2005a) was used to develop the questionnaire for 
the survey. It was also informed by related research on the career paths of scientists in 
Australia (Turpin et al., 2005). 
The survey questionnaire presented 48 propositions about the respondent’s 
experience with the CRC program, under four headings: 
1. the benefits of CRC participation to the respondent and their organization; 
2. the problems encountered; 
3. the management strategies adopted for participation; and  
4. the effect of CRC participation on research training and career structures. 
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Respondents were invited to rate each proposition on a six-point Likert scale. The 
final question (optional) in each section allowed an open-ended response to each 
theme. More than half of the respondents answered at least one of these open-ended 
questions. 
The survey results permit a quantitative ranking of the main benefits and 
problems in CRC participation; the management strategies adopted; and the effect of 
CRC participation on research careers. They allow comparisons, for example, of the 
views of participants from the university and government research sectors (Garrett-
Jones et al., 2005b). Data are presented in Table 1 to show those questions that 
elicited the strongest opinions from the greatest number of respondents. 
Responses to open-ended questions in the survey convey the ‘CRC 
experience’ in the participants’ own words and help to illuminate and interpret their 
quantitative responses on a range of management issues identified in Table 1. The 
results offer some new insights into the critical issues raised earlier. In particular, they 
show considerable consistency in explaining why research personnel join CRCs but 
considerable differences in the nature of concerns about remaining in the CRC 
collaborative environment. 
 
5. Rewards and Risk in CRC participation 
 
5.1 The issue of goals  
 
The first theme concerns the goals and expectations of the Australian researchers. 
Respondents to the survey provided a strong endorsement of the benefits of 
participation in the CRCs. An overwhelming majority expressed pride in their CRC 
membership (see Table 1, proposition C1) saw it as complementing their other 
professional work (C4), and enhancing collaboration (C3). A majority also valued the 
effect of the CRC on the cohesion of their research team (C2), and as an avenue for 
technology development that was not otherwise available (C10). Nearly half of the 
respondents felt that the CRC’s impact on improved project management was 
beneficial (D5). More tangibly a majority viewed the CRC Program as an important 
source of research funds (C7) and (for a substantial minority of respondents) the 
CRCs provided access to essential research facilities in other organizations (C6).  
 11
Academic (HE) and government research (GR) respondents differed 
significantly on two propositions. HE respondents rated professional and 
administrative support from the CRC as more important than did GR respondents. 
Further, while both agreed with the proposition that the CRC complemented their 
professional activities (C4), there was a significant difference in the distribution of 
responses with the HE respondents being less unanimous in their agreement. We 
explain these differing responses as reflecting a the more integrated management style 
typical of public research institutes on the one hand, with those more usually 
experienced in the university sector. 
In the open-ended questions, respondents nominated both material and 
intangible benefit in membership of their CRC: ‘my association with the CRC has 
been extremely beneficial and rewarding and I can think of few downsides to my 
participation in the CRC’ (GR-358); ‘it is one of the best things that has happened for 
me’ (GR-61); ‘money for continuing research activities - the chase for the dollar!’ 
(HE-343), with ‘greater stability and longer-term funding’ (HE-337) than available 
elsewhere; for particular activities such as ‘opportunities for conference 
attendance/workshop participation not otherwise supported by my organization’ (GO-
356); funds for staff and ‘generous PhD scholarships’ (GR-90). ‘I got a real good 
(well two) student PhDs’ wrote HE-311.1 
However, in contrast to the observations made by Lee’s US study (2000) most 
benefits reported were intangible, most notably the value of relations with researchers 
in their own field and in other disciplines: ‘working with peers from other 
organizations whom I respect’ (CC-118); a ‘widened fraternity of scientists with 
similar interest/goals’ (GR-263); or simply ‘access to ideas’ (GR-307). These contacts 
were either unavailable through their university or research institute or were more 
difficult to arrange:  
opportunity to work within a team with similar research interests and opportunities for cross-
fertilisation and collaboration with other researchers. If I weren’t associated with the CRC I 
would be working mostly in isolation. (HE-222) 
Several respondents commented on ‘closer relations with industry’ (HE-152) and 
provision of a business or commercial focus for their research: one gained a ‘wider 
view of my research area, especially with respect to application of results in industry’ 
(OT-140). In short, many respondents saw a significant cost in not being part of a 
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CRC as it provided an otherwise missing element to their ‘scientific context’, 
including application of their research. 
The Australian respondents placed less import on the material benefit of 
funding (compared to Lee’s US study), probably because research funding in 
Australian universities (and of course in government labs, which were not surveyed 
by Lee) is not as wholly dependent on direct grants as are US universities. In 
particular, our findings strongly endorse Lee’s comment that: 
First and foremost, faculty members who participate in industry-sponsored research have their 
own research agendas … The most important motivational consideration for them is to 
complement their academic research agenda. (Lee, 2000, pp. 120-1) 
We argue that the extent of consistency in the nature of anticipated reward is an 
important factor that can underpin the organizational durability of the CRC model. 
Our survey also explored a range of propositions about potential problems with 
membership of a CRC. These included issues such as short-term research objectives 
or a lack of intellectual challenge in industry-related projects, publication restrictions, 
isolation from other colleagues who were not in the CRC, distortion of organizational 
goals or a disjunction between reward systems, and lack of adequate return on 
investment. Unlike the consensus we found on benefits, there was no widespread 
agreement by respondents on the problems and risks of participation in CRCs.  
A minority of respondents felt any conflict between their ‘home’ employment 
and the demands of the CRC (D8); that their institutions was subsidising their 
involvement in the CRC (D7); that there was a degree of ‘lock-in’ to the CRC projects 
which might restrict an appropriate change of direction by participants (D9); or that 
industry participants were too intent on short-term objectives (D3). 
In contrast, another set of possible issues was rejected as important by around 
half of the respondents and supported by only a small minority. CRC participation had 
not reduced the respondents’ interaction with other students and research staff (F10); 
nor had the CRC distorted their organization’s research priorities (D11) nor led to 
undue competition with their ‘home’ colleagues (D10)). In particular, the proposition 
that industry projects lacked challenge (D4) was strongly rejected. Responses to other 
questions on scholarly publication and limiting opportunities for fundamental research 
(not shown in Table 1) were more equivocal, suggesting that these issues were 
significant for some participants.  
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What this tells us is that there are no overriding problems in the organization 
arrangements and management of the CRCs, but that particular issues are important or 
even crucial for some participants. For example only a small minority of respondents 
agreed that the CRC had any positive effect on their gaining research council grants (a 
critical issue for academic researchers) (F12), and over half of the respondents to the 
question disagreed/strongly disagreed. This was the third question where the 
responses of the higher education (HE) and government researchers (GR) differed 
significantly. Further, the HE group slightly disagreed that CRC participation had 
increased their opportunities for scholarly publication. This leads us to suggest that 
some HE researchers are experiencing difficulty in reconciling their role within the 
CRC with the drivers of career advancement in the university and success in peer 
reviewed academic research council grants (Garrett-Jones et al., 2005b). 
 
5.2 The issue of trust 
 
Our second theme concerns the role of trust in respect of the scientific programs and 
governance of the CRC. While scientific opportunities were the main motivating 
factors it was threatened curtailment of these opportunities that were perceived as 
major risks. Comments made in response to the open-ended questions in the survey 
showed that respondents potentially regard as negative anything – like publication 
restrictions – which impinged on their research activity and output.  
 
5.2.1 Trusting administrative procedures 
 
Managing a complex interorganizational network such as a CRC carries substantial 
overheads. While we received an equivocal response to the question about whether 
CRCs were ‘too bureaucratic’ many respondents regarded administrative overheads as 
both unnecessary and as more onerous than with alternative forms of research support. 
‘Transaction costs are very high’ (GR-230) was a typical response when asked about 
problems with the management of the CRC. Others commented: ‘more forms, more 
paperwork, more reviews’ (GR-125); ‘there is a large administrative cost linking 
different institutions’ (HE-141); ‘I was frustrated by how cumbersome the CRC was’ 
(GR-100); and ‘dual reporting needs’ (GO-164). ‘Compared to an ARC grant, a CRC 
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has a much greater administrative cost and suffers from the possibility that the funds 
can be altered through the life of a project’ said one academic (HE-141).  
We were interested to explore this issue further and to explain why this was so 
strongly felt. First, respondents saw little benefit flowing back to themselves or their 
research groups: ‘unnecessary forms, timesheets etc. with no management feedback 
even to project leaders; so seems pointless’ (HE-121). Second, the politicking and 
management distracted them from their main concern of carrying out research: 
‘massive percentage of funds spent on administration rather than research’ (HE-335); 
‘the CRC reporting requirements strongly impinge on research time and activities’ 
(HE-3). Other comments included: ‘too much money spent on “organization” – 
meetings etc… Not enough for research. CRCs should be about research’ (HE-200); 
or the ‘focus is not on research’ (HE-254). Ultimately, this could lead to frustration 
and individual reaction: 
‘my attempts to maintain an external collaboration tore me apart (double management 
reporting presentation etc) so much that I am leaving this job with the CRC to take a regular 
funded position overseas with clean and simple funding provided + 30% salary increase’ (HE-
52). 
In short, there appears little trust in the potential of what are described as burdensome 
administrative procedures to deliver benefit to the researcher or research project.  
Although CRCs are not ‘cooperatives’ in the sense of being member-based, 
democratically controlled organizations they start this way, by recruiting voluntary 
participants in the bid for grant funding. We found that this cooperative thinking 
permeates the participants’ continuing expectations. The majority of respondents 
agreed on the importance of fully representative governance for the CRC (E6), while 
acknowledging the roles of the CEO and board members in the CRC’s success (E5 
and E7). In contrast only a minority ‘agreed/strongly agreed’ that their views were 
adequately represented on the CRC governing boards (D13) or that they had enough 
influence over decisions by the CRC (D12). Indeed, a substantial minority of 
respondents ‘disagreed/strongly disagreed’ that they had an adequate say. Comments 
we received showed that the respondents expect a strong voice in the strategy and 
running of the CRC and that they were unhappy when they were not consulted and 
involved: ‘I do not have much say in the affairs of CRC. I know I have the capacity to 
contribute more but no takers’ (GR-31). ‘We get told what to do!’ (HE-264). This 
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suggests that a desire for organization ‘engagement’ is frustrated by limited trust that 
such engagement is achievable. 
 
5.2.2 Trusting scientific credibility 
 
Respondents’ comments showed that trust between partners in the CRC is expressed 
both in terms of scientific competence (ability) and commitment or intention 
(integrity/benevolence). Competence expressed itself particularly in respondents’ 
assessment of the quality of the researchers in the collaboration: ‘this can result in a 
lot of “B grade” researchers doing quite limited work’ (HE-7); or ‘company members 
supply their second-level staff’ (HE-121). They were critical of the CRC failing to 
enrol the best researchers: 
The university with the most knowledge may not necessarily be working on the project. Who 
is doing the work is more likely to be the uni that initiates the proposal (GO-37). 
Failings by other partners resulting in ‘competition at the expense of collaboration’ 
(HE-199) were generally interpreted in terms of the party’s self-interest and lack of 
commitment, rather than their incapacity: ‘some institutions are NOT  “cooperative” ’ 
said one (HE-253); ‘certain individuals from other academic institutions [forget] that 
the first  “C” stands for cooperative’ (HE-79). Others commented on the ‘failure of 
some researchers to collaborate openly and fairly’ (HE-386). The above comments 
suggest a concern that the partners are delivering ‘their best’. Respondents lost faith in 
their partners when they were: (1) viewed as poor quality researchers, (2) viewed as 
incapable of delivering knowledge, results or feedback, or (3) seemed to lack 
commitment to the ethos of cooperation or were perceived to be pursuing their own 
ends. Two factors commonly mentioned that led to this lack of trust were: (1) 
inadequate commitment of resources (usually people and money) — either actual or 
perceived (or unverifiable), and (2) domination of or undue influence on the direction 
of the collaboration or of the potential rewards. The way that CRCs were structured 
made it difficult for partners to assess whether each other was ‘pulling their weight’: 
‘costing models between partners are wildly different and project budgeting is a major 
source of mistrust’ (GR-96) said one government researcher. Reneging on 
commitments was also viewed seriously by an academic respondent: ‘ensuring in-
kind contributions match commitments’ (HE-184); ‘commitment of individual staff is 
low … and over-ridden by host institution priorities’ (HE-89). ‘Inflexible and one-
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sided IP arrangements’ (GR-123) were also viewed with distrust as a form of self-
interest. 
The issue of trust as expressed in the experiences of our CRC research 
personnel reflects the two dimensions of trust elaborated by Nooteboom (2000): 
competence and intention. But the findings discussed above suggest both are directed 
at partner organizations, rather than individuals. The concerns are about who they 
deliver, the extent to which they listen to me, or the extent of resources they deliver. 
This may reflect an organizational ‘settling-in’ issue, as personnel learn to trust or 
otherwise (through experience). Alternatively, it may reflect a deeper structural 
problem inherent in bringing together partners with differing organizational cultures 
and functional domains. 
 
5.3 Managing careers, rewards and risks 
 
The third theme that stands out in the literature concerns the ways research 
personnel are influenced in their career decisions by working in a CRC. A large 
minority of respondents felt that CRC participation had enhanced their career 
prospects generally (F7), improved the way they worked with industry partners (F8) 
and provided a positive influence on redirecting their research (F9). Respondents were 
more equivocal about whether it had improved their prospects of internal promotion. 
The HE group slightly disagreed that the CRC had enhanced their prospects for 
promotion within their university whereas the GR group felt that CRC involvement 
had slightly benefited their prospect of internal promotion.  
Respondents commented on benefit related to their own careers and 
capabilities in the following terms: assisting with ‘career progression’ (GR-134); 
‘greatly increased scope and confidence of use in applying for senior jobs’ (HE-272); 
or for others, ‘networking and identification of other commercial/clinical areas have 
re-focused my research career’ (GR-229); ‘better understanding of IP management 
and commercialisation’ (CC-360); and ‘got me to work more efficiently (to meet 
deadlines)’ (HE-312).  
Team cohesion was also mentioned: a ‘means of uniting the interests of 
departmental members who would otherwise have quite disparate interests’ (HE-215); 
and ‘the program gives a strong strategic focus for a major research group in [my 
organization]’ (GR-231). Status and recognition within the organization has resulted: 
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‘a useful lever to get better support within my organization’ (GR-138) commented 
another.  
In summary, respondents generally saw CRCs as very valuable in providing 
both material and intangible rewards. The material rewards (e.g. funding) were ranked 
less highly than the less tangible: these latter included improvement in their 
interaction with the scientific community; the perspectives that researchers in other 
disciplines and institutions brought to their research; the view of ‘different ways of 
doing things’ that interaction with commercial firms gave them; or attracting high 
quality research students to their team. Significantly – in their open-ended responses – 
they couched the benefits in terms of advantage to their research group and their 
research careers rather than to their organization as a whole. Respondents took what 
we might term a strongly academic, scientific and personal view of the benefits of 
CRC membership. The importance of the participating partners vis a vis the CRC 





In the early stages of the program many CRCs were relatively loose networks, few 
were legally incorporated. The government now requires the incorporation of almost 
all CRCs which carries pressures to establish enduring organizational arrangements. 
How CRC research personnel expect such arrangements to evolve and how they 
experience the process will be an important factor in determining their organizational 
durability.  
 As discussed earlier, previous research has suggested that the nature of the 
specific technology and commercial objectives of the collaborating partners tend to 
steer the strategic management approaches. This is also the case for CRCs in 
Australia. However, our interest has been to reveal more precisely why this is so. We 
propose that it is the nature of reward and risk for the research personnel and how 
they manage the balance that will determine the most effective management 
strategies.  
We observe that the basic drivers of collaboration and the benefits reported 
by research personnel in the Australian CRC are likely to be common among other 
similar triple helix arrangements. Of the management issues that arise, some will be a 
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feature of most cross-sector R&D organizations, some will pertain only to the specific 
arrangements in the Australian CRCs, and some will be restricted to individual CRCs 
and participant institutions. This is because the degree of homogeneity of goals for 
participant organizations, the factors affecting the acquisition of trust, and the career 
risks will vary from centre to centre. For some research staff career risks are greater if 
employed in some CRCs rather than others, or compared to employment in a 
traditional academic department. There is also some indication that participation in a 
CRC carries more of a personal career risk for university researchers than for 
government researchers. Ultimately it is resolving this sort of cost/benefit dilemma 
that drives strategic decisions.  
The present study was not designed to explore causal relationships between 
the propositions addressed by our respondents nor the extent to which each may or 
may not have been formative in driving management strategies and organizational 
change. Rather, our concern was to draw attention to the expectations and experiences 
of CRC research personnel and reflect on how these might cement these triple helix 
structures as an enduring organizational form. 
We find that one of the most valued aspects of CRC membership is the 
extension of research networks and access to new ‘research users’. This leads us to 
support the validity of Dietz and Bozeman’s (2005) observation that academic 
research careers are changing in a fundamental way, not because of the nature of 
research undertaken but because the centres enable researchers to move in new 
directions. Working within a cross-sector R&D centre can be a substitute for and 
perhaps a ‘safer’ option than actually taking a job within industry, and yet still provide 
benefits of access to what Dietz and Bozeman (p. 349) call ‘new social networks and 
scientific and technical human capital’. In this way the Australian CRCs provide a 
platform for negotiating triple helix institutional and organizational management 
frameworks. To the extent that the outcome of such negotiation becomes 
institutionally embedded in their organizational structure and successful technology 
transfer, these centres are likely to become drivers of change in the way universities 
interact with industry more generally. 
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Table 1. Selected responses from the survey 
 








C1 I am proud to be associated with the CRC. 368 5.1 79% 4%
C4 My work associated with the CRC complements my other professional activities 
and responsibilities closely. 362 5.0 78% 4%
C3 The multi-centre model of the CRC enhances collaboration. 362 4.6 69% 12%
C2 Involvement in the CRC improves the cohesion of my research team. 348 4.6 61% 10%
C8 The commercial partners in the CRC give an important focus to my research 
objectives. 348 4.4 57% 15%
C7 CRC funds are an important source of external finance which my organization 
uses to leverage other funding. 350 4.4 57% 16%
C10 Engagement in the CRC offers an avenue for bringing technology concepts to 
fruition that would be difficult to achieve by other means. 344 4.4 55% 15%
C6 The CRC gives me essential access to research facilities and equipment in the 
other participant organizations. 340 3.9 40% 26%
D5 Commercial requirements for improved project management and agreed 
timelines are beneficial for researchers in my organization. 330 4.1 49% 13%
D7 My department/institution appears to be subsidising my involvement in the 
CRC. 322 3.9 45% 27%
D13 My views are adequately represented on the CRC Board and its committees. 341 3.9 45% 23%
D9 It is difficult to change our level of commitment to CRC as circumstances 
change. 316 3.9 42% 21%
D3 Industry participants in the CRC are too intent on short-term objectives. 350 3.9 36% 21%
D8 My conditions of employment (e.g. workload model, performance agreement) 
do not adequately reflect the time I need to devote to the CRC. 321 3.8 40% 31%
D12 I feel I have an appropriate degree of influence over decisions made by the 
CRC. 348 3.7 43% 28%
D4 Industry led research projects in the CRC are not sufficiently challenging. 331 2.9 15% 50%
D2 University partners have too much say in shaping the research directions of the 
CRC. 359 2.9 11% 46%
(1) Excluding responses of ‘not applicable’ and missing values 
(2) Responses were given values on a scale from 1 (Strongly Disagree) through to 6 (Strongly Agree) 
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Table 1. Selected responses from the survey (cont.) 
 








D11 The research objectives of the CRC have distorted research priorities in other 
parts of my organization. 329 2.8 12% 56%
D10 There is too much competition between CRC staff and others at my institution. 329 2.7 14% 57%
E6 Participants in the CRC need to be fully represented on the Board. 347 4.4 61% 19%
E5 The CEO is the lynch pin of the success of the CRC. 350 4.3 55% 15%
E7 The ability and experience of the individual Board members determine the 
CRC’s success. 350 4.2 48% 14%
E1 My organization has developed a specific management regime for CRCs. 315 3.8 40% 25%
E9 My colleagues in the CRC are more important to me than those elsewhere. 339 2.9 15% 49%
E4 The CRC operates much like any academic department. 354 2.8 13% 46%
E2 Performance measures adopted for the CRC have caused my organization to 
change the way it reports research outputs. 307 2.8 12% 55%
F2 It is productive for postgraduate students to be supervised jointly by academics 
and researchers from government research organizations. 352 5.1 83% 2%
F1 It is productive for postgraduate students to be supervised jointly by academic 
and industry researchers. 350 5.0 78% 4%
F8 CRC participation has improved the way I work with industry partners 
generally. 341 4.1 43% 16%
F9 CRC participation has been a positive influence in redirecting my research 
activities. 320 4.1 44% 18%
F7 My work with the CRC has enhanced my career prospects generally. 336 4.1 45% 18%
F10 CRC participation has reduced my interaction with students and research staff 
outside the CRC. 320 3.0 16% 47%
F12 CRC participation has increased my potential for ARC / NHMRC research grant 
funding. 252 2.8 15% 52%
(1) Excluding responses of ‘not applicable’ and missing values 
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